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Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court [electronic resource] / edited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Constitutionalism and democracyPublication details: Charlottesville : University of Virginia Press, 2006.Description: xix, 335 p. : illOther title:
  • Institutional games and the US Supreme Court
  • Institutional games and the United States Supreme Court
Subject(s): Genre/Form: DDC classification:
  • 347.73/26 22
LOC classification:
  • KF8742.A5 I57 2006
Online resources:
Contents:
Strategic games with Congress and the states -- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin -- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers -- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn -- "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg -- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers -- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy -- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan -- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson -- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire -- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum -- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode
Ebook TUS: Midlands, Main Library Athlone Online eBook (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available

Includes bibliographical references (p. [297]-313) and index.

Strategic games with Congress and the states -- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin -- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers -- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn -- "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg -- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers -- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy -- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan -- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson -- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire -- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum -- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.

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